Momentum, Reversal, and Uninformed Traders in Laboratory Markets
Archival studies provide extensive evidence of short-term price momentum and longterm price reversal. 1 We report the results of two studies intended to assess the robustness of momentum and reversal in controlled laboratory environments, and test how the behavior of uninformed traders influences these phenomena. A laboratory market allows us to manipulate variables of interest (such as news and the presence of uninformed traders) in a controlled way, hold constant other variables (such as firm and market characteristics), and observe data that would not normally be available in public data sets. Our results suggest that momentum is a robust phenomenon when news is disseminated slowly across traders, but that long-term reversals arise only in the presence of uninformed traders. Uninformed traders act as trendchasers when informed traders cannot condition on market price, but act as contrarians when informed traders can condition on price. In the former setting, they create long-term reversals by creating overreactions to information, which are subsequently reversed (as in the model of Hong and Stein (1999) ). In the latter setting, they create long-term reversals by continuing their contrarian reaction to news long after the informed traders have stopped reacting to the news.
Our results thus contribute both to the debate over the causes of momentum and reversal, and to the debate over the behavior and market influence of individual investors and noise traders, who are presumed to be uninformed (Barber, Odean, and Zhu (2005) , Kaniel, Saar, and Titman (2006) ).
We use the model of Hong and Stein (1999, hereafter referred to as 'HS') as the basis for our market setting. HS includes two types of traders, each restricted to imperfectly rational behavior. Informed traders observe information (news) about security fundamental value, but do not condition their trades on price. Because of autocorrelation in news releases, a market including only informed traders would exhibit short-term momentum in returns, but absent other forms of irrationality would not exhibit long-term reversal. Uninformed traders do not observe news, and condition their trades only on past returns.
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Uninformed traders who faced no restrictions on their trading behavior would anticipate and exploit the price momentum introduced by informed traders, forcing prices to be weak-form efficient. However, HS assume that uninformed traders use only a small number of variables to determine when to take on a trading position, and must hold that position for a predetermined horizon. These restrictions lead to an equilibrium in which uninformed traders engage in momentum trading, causing prices to overreact to news releases in the short-run, and causing short-term momentum in prices. As uninformed traders close out their positions, the overreaction is eliminated, resulting in long-term reversal of price changes.
Our first experiment uses robot informed traders who respond to news (and ignore price) in a manner guaranteeing that informed traders introduce the short-term momentum assumed by HS. The markets also include four human uninformed traders who have restricted informationas in HS, they observe only market activity and cannot observe news directly, but are allowed to take on and close out positions whenever they wish, and base those decisions on whatever information they observe. To simplify arbitrage, uninformed traders are permitted to trade on margin to take large long or short positions. Rational, risk-neutral uninformed traders would completely discipline any predictability of returns introduced by informed trader irrationality.
Risk aversion would result in incomplete elimination of momentum, but would not introduce reversal. However, limits to uninformed trader rationality of the form assumed by HS would also create long-term reversal. Other deviations from rationality could cause different patterns of return predictability. In particular, strong contrarian behavior, of the form often seen among individual traders (e.g., Kaniel, Saar and Titman 2006) could lead to reversals in the short run.
Consistent with archival evidence, and with HS, we find strong evidence of both shortterm momentum and long-term reversal in returns: returns are positively associated with prior returns over short horizons, but negatively associated with returns over longer horizons. As predicted by HS, uninformed traders engage in momentum trading, buying immediately after observing positive returns, and selling immediately after observing negative returns. This momentum trading fails to eliminate short-term price momentum, and also causes prices to overreact to news. Reversals arise when those overreactions are ultimately corrected.
In our second experiment, we allow human traders to play the role of traders who can see both news and price; for simplicity, we still call them "informed traders," to distinguish them from uninformed traders who never see news. The experiment includes five cohorts with four informed traders and no uninformed traders, and four cohorts with four informed traders and three uninformed traders. This design allows us to examine the behavior of informed traders in isolation, and also understand the effects of informed traders on uninformed traders and market behavior. As in HS, news follows a random walk, but circulates slowly through the group of informed traders. Perfectly rational informed traders who can also see price would generate prices that are serially uncorrelated, despite the serial correlation in news. However, prior evidence from laboratory markets suggests that traders' rarely extract all of the information that is available in prices (e.g., Bloomfield 1996a Bloomfield , 1996b , leading us to predict that returns will exhibit short-term momentum even in the absence of uninformed traders. Assuming that can trade.
uninformed traders behave as they did in experiment one (even though they now face informed traders who also see price), we expect larger short-term momentum and long-term reversal when uninformed traders are present.
When markets include only informed traders, we observe short-term momentum but little evidence of long-term reversal. Introducing uninformed traders has little effect on short-term momentum, but generates long-term reversal. While these patterns are consistent with the predictions of HS, the cause is quite different, because uninformed traders behave as contrarian traders, rather than momentum traders. The uninformed traders' contrarian reaction to extreme news releases lasts longer than the informed traders' reaction, so that prices eventually reverse direction. Uninformed traders have long-term influence over price partly because their contrarian trading forces informed traders to take large positions to drive prices to the levels indicated by their news, reducing their willingness to continue taking positions as time passes.
Overall, our results indicate that short-term momentum is a robust phenomenon, while long-term reversal requires the participation of uninformed traders who condition their trading behavior on market prices. Our results contribute to the literature of momentum and reversal in part by avoiding many of the caveats that must attend archival studies of naturally-occurring data. For example, our markets are unlikely to include time-varying risk factors, we can directly identify informed and uninformed traders (rather than having to infer information from trading behavior), and we can manipulate the presence of such traders while controlling for factors that often covary with the relative activity of uninformed traders (such as analyst coverage, industry, and firm size).
Our second experiment also contributes to the literature on the behavior and influence of individual investors, who are often said to be relatively less-informed. There is "widespread agreement that individuals tend to be contrarians" (Kaniel, Saar and Titman (2006) , p. 25), but archival methods are poorly suited to determining how informed such traders are, whether their presumed lack of information drives their contrarian behavior, and why returns subsequent to intense individual trading tend to reflect momentum over the short term (a matter of weeks in Barber, et al. (2005) and Kaniel et al. (2006) ), while reflecting reversal over the long term (a matter of six months or a year in Odean (1999) and Barber and Odean (2000) ). By assigning traders randomly to settings with and without access to news about fundamentals, and holding all other factors constant (such as access to capital), our results suggest that the information asymmetry itself is enough to generate contrarian behavior. This contrarian behavior has limited short-term impact, but does have longer-term impact by forcing other traders to take on more risk to drive prices to the levels that their news indicates would be appropriate.
There are obvious differences between the momentum and reversal observed in our markets, and that observed in studies of CRSP data-in particular, our momentum and reversal is measured in seconds and minutes, while momentum and reversal observed in CRSP data is measured in months and years. However, our primary goal is not merely to simulate phenomena observed in empirical studies, but to present valid tests of a theoretical model that has been proposed to explain momentum and reversal. While we do not capture all of the features of the real world, we do faithfully capture those that drive momentum and reversal in the theoretical model. Nevertheless, our results raise doubts about the validity of this model, which assumes that traders who have information about fundamental value ignore information in price. We find that human informed traders violate this assumption, but that uninformed traders nevertheless drive long-term reversals for very different reasons from those proposed by HS.
Finally, we note that our markets represent an important methodological step toward allowing laboratory researchers to examine increasingly complicated theories. Many models of market anomalies involve reactions to time-series data (such as monthly returns or quarterly accounting data), and models seeking to explain those anomalies assume a long sequence of related trading periods (e.g, Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) , Gervais and Odean (2001) , as well as HS). However, most previous laboratory markets are able to examine reactions to only a small number of information releases, because they use an extremely complicated trading mechanism (the double auction). In contrast, we use a market in which price is a simple linear function of net demand, as assumed in many theoretical models, and which allows traders to simply make buy and sell decisions at posted prices. This simplicity allows traders to process more complex information, and also allows us to present traders with the long time-series that are needed to replicate the portfolio analyses used in archival work, and which drive results in models. Future research could apply our market technology to other settings, and examine the robustness of results to relaxations of the linear pricing function.
The next section describes the model of HS, the design of our first experiment, and the details of the laboratory market setting. Section II presents the results of experiment one.
Section III describes the design and results of experiment two, and Section IV presents conclusions, limitations and directions for future research.
I. Background, Design, and Market Setting

A.1. Hong and Stein's Model
In this section we describe the market setting that we used in our experiments to capture the essential features that are essential to driving short-term momentum and long-term reversal in the market price at any time t can be represented as their average expectation of the terminal dividend, plus adjustments to reflect the cumulative demand of the uninformed traders and the total net supply of the security. They further assume that there are z equal-sized groups of informed traders, and that each news item is distributed to an additional group each period, so that τ periods after an innovation, exactly τ /z of the informed traders know the information. As a result, the market price is P t = D t + {(z -1)ε t+1 + (z -2)ε t+2 + … + ε t+z+1 }/z -θQ, where D t represents the terminal dividend, ε t represents a news innovation released at time t, Q is the supply of the underlying asset, and θ is a function of informed trader risk aversion and the variance of the information innovations (HS, equation 1).
The failure of informed traders to extract information from market price leads to positive serial correlation in returns over short periods. To see why, assume a new innovation increases the final dividend expected by those who learn about it. As soon as the innovation is released, only 1/z know the good news, so prices rise only slightly; however, prices will be expected to rise by the same amount in the next period, because another 1/z of the informed traders observe the news.
To examine the role of uninformed traders in creating price reversal, HS assume that in every period t, a new generation of traders buys or sells based only on past price changes, but does not observe any news about fundamental value. Specifically, the uninformed traders born
in period t open positions of φ(P t-1 -P t-k-1 ) shares, hold that position for j periods, and then close the position completely. Each generation of uninformed traders is of the same size, and has identical constant absolute risk aversion. HS focus their equilibrium analysis on stationary values of φ that maximize each generation of uninformed trader utility, and allow the variance of price dynamics to have constant covariance over the k-period windows that determine uninformed traders' trading positions, and also constant covariance of the k-period windows with the j-period horizon over which uninformed traders hold their positions.
HS prove that as long as uninformed traders are not too risk averse, an equilibrium value of φ exists that satisfies the stationarity assumptions above. Their first result is that φ* > 0, so that they must be trend-chasers, opening up long positions after prices rise and opening up short positions after prices fall. (This result explains why HS refer to the uninformed traders as "momentum traders." However, because we have no guarantee that the stationary equilibrium will be obtained in the lab, we refer to these traders more generically as uninformed traders.)
Trend-chasing by uninformed traders exacerbates the short-term momentum in prices that would arise in the absence of uninformed traders, because the uninformed traders effectively "pile on" to the momentum that is created by informed traders' delayed reaction to news, rather than disciplining it. Assume, for example, a positive innovation becomes known to the informed traders. Proposition 1 of HS proves that markets initially react too little to the shock (because the informed traders do not draw inferences from market price), but that the cumulative return eventually reflects an overreaction to the innovation (because the uninformed traders are also buying, in response to the rising prices). Eventually, the market price must reverse this overreaction (as the echoes of the initial return dissipate), resulting in an overall pattern of shortterm momentum and long-term reversal.
A.2. Goals of Our Experiments
As is necessary for any behavioral model in finance, HS make a variety of assumptions that allow them to characterize market inefficiencies in a tractable manner. "Structural"
assumptions restrict the generality of the information available to market participants, and the nature of market interaction. For example, HS assume that innovations are uncorrelated, that the news is disseminated at a constant rate among informed traders, and that the market price is a linear function of information and cumulative demand. "Behavioral" assumptions restrict the possible inferences and behaviors of the traders. For example, HS assume that informed traders extract no information from market price, that uninformed traders always condition their trades on returns over the same window (and no other information), and that uninformed traders always hold their positions for the same horizon. "Equilibrium" assumptions restrict the nature of the equilibrium HS choose to examine-they require the equilibria to have a stationary variance and covariance structure.
We conduct two experiments intended to examine whether the key results of HS retain predictive power when the structural assumptions in HS are largely retained, but the behavioral and equilibrium assumptions are relaxed. For our first experiment, we use a robot to play the role of the informed traders, and focus on the behavior of the uninformed traders. In our second experiment (discussed later), we replace the robot informed trader with human informed traders, to test the robustness of the model's predictions to relaxed behavioral assumptions about informed traders (in particular, their ability to draw inferences from market price). Our second experiment also allows us to examine the behavior of uninformed traders when their information is dominated by that of the informed traders, and to draw clear inferences about their influence on market prices, by manipulating their presence or absence.
It is of particular importance that our markets replicate the linear pricing function used in HS. One interpretation of the linear pricing function is that market prices are unaffected by the timing of trade: A single purchase of 100 shares in a single period has the same price impact as the purchase of one share in each of 100 periods. This assumption is at odds with the empirical observation that large supply shocks have temporary price effects driven by the finite rate at which markets can replenish their liquidity. These temporary price effects are unlikely to affect the nature of long-term reversal, but may well explain why real markets exhibit reversal over the very short term (hours, days and even weeks). By imposing a linear pricing function, we are able to rule out short-term effects, like the bid-ask bounce, that might interfere with our inferences about the validity of the model.
B.1. News and Prices in the Laboratory Market
Our first goal in experiment 1 was to create a market in which the price process with a single robot informed trader has constant variance and covariance structure, and exhibits shortterm momentum. To simplify the task of uninformed traders, we accomplished these goals by creating a very simple Poisson structure for the dividend process. Specifically, we created a security that paid a single liquidating dividend at the end of 280 seconds of trading. This dividend was determined by a predetermined random process that starts at 500. Every second, there was a news innovation that indicates either a $1 increase or a $1 decrease in the liquidating dividend. The first news release was equally likely to be good news or bad news. After that point, each news release had a 95% chance of having the same direction (good or bad) as the preceding news release. As a result, the news paths exhibited strong positive autocorrelation over the short term, declining over longer intervals. A sample news path is shown in Figure 1 .
The news of the security stopped changing with 10 seconds remaining in the market, to allow uninformed traders a "quiet time" in which to adjust their positions before payment of the liquidating dividend.
We assume that prices are set in a manner similar to that in HS. Prices in our markets were determined by the following equation:
Market Price = 500 + λ (Cumulative Trader Demand).
As in HS, prices change linearly in the cumulative demand of the traders. (HS are able to provide more structure on the market price by assuming that demand is a function of past price changes). The constant λ , which we set to 0.125 in light of pilot testing, reflects the risk tolerance of a hypothetical 'specialist' who sets prices to match the linear function proposed by HS. The robot informed trader bases trades only on the value of the news innovation, and not its implications for future news. Thus, absent uninformed traders, prices exhibit short-term momentum caused by autocorrelation in informed trader demand. To allow prices to be only whole numbers, we truncated all fractions; for example, cumulative trader demand of 20 would lead to a price increase of 2, while cumulative trader demand of -20 would lead to a price decrease of 2.
B.2. Introducing Uninformed Traders
While HS impose a variety of behavioral assumptions on uninformed traders, we impose only one: uninformed traders are unable to directly observe news releases, observing only the sequence of prices and trading volumes. Uninformed traders can condition their trades on any aspect of market history they care to, rather than being restricted (as in HS) to conditioning only on the return over a single fixed window. They can also condition their holding period on any observable information, rather than being restricted to a constant horizon.
Because uninformed trader behavior is unrestricted, there is no clear reason to believe that the short-term momentum and long-term reversal predicted by HS will be observed. If uninformed traders are risk-neutral, the intuition underlying most market efficiency arguments suggests that prices should be weak-form efficient. Risk aversion would limit uninformed traders' ability to eliminate momentum, but would not introduce any reversals. Within the context of HS, long-term reversals require limited rationality on the part of uninformed traders.
However, other forms of irrationality, such as strong short-term contrarian behavior, could result in different deviations from weak-form efficiency, such as short-term reversals.
B.3. Subjects, Instructions, and Incentives
During a 75-minute experimental session, participants in experiment one trade in markets of four human traders who always trade together (we refer to these trader groupings as 'cohorts') and one robot informed trader. In each market, cohorts traded a single security, which represents a claim on the liquidating dividend that is paid out at the end of the 280 seconds. The security for each market follows a unique, predetermined news path, such that news is manipulated within cohorts but held constant between cohorts, allowing us to control for cohort differences in our analyses.
The experiment was conducted in the Business Simulation Laboratory (BSL) at the Johnson Graduate School of Management at Cornell University. The participants in the experiments were graduate and undergraduate students from a variety of programs at Cornell, primarily the Johnson School's MBA program and Cornell University's engineering programs.
All traders had previously participated in several sessions sharing the basic features of the sessions reported here.
ensure that trades reflect uninformed traders' sincere belief that they can predict future price changes, and inhibits their ability to "game" the price mechanism.
We determine cash winnings for each session by subtracting a "floor" from each trader's winnings in laboratory dollars, and then multiplying by an exchange rate that converts laboratory dollars into US dollars. The floor and exchange rate were derived from pilot experiments, and were designed so that traders would receive average winnings of approximately $30/session (with an expected minimum payment of $5). However, to minimize any gaming behavior, traders
were not told the floor or exchange rate,.
The trading screen is shown in see Figure 2 . We continuously reported to traders their current cash balance, share exposure, average cost or revenue per share in inventory, as well as realized and unrealized gains. 5 The screen also reported the current market price, the number of shares bought and sold by the trader and by the market. Finally, a graph on the lower right of the screen depicted price and volume over time. Traders could adjust this chart to track market activity in increments of 1, 2, 5, 10 and 20 seconds.
II. Results of Experiment One
The first goal in our analysis is to determine whether prices follow the basic pattern of short-term reversal and long-term momentum observed in archival studies, and predicted by HS in a setting similar to ours. We test for such patterns by conducting portfolio analyses similar to those conducted by archival researchers: we identify intervals of trade during which returns are extremely high or extremely low, and assess whether returns in later periods continue those trends or reverse them. To determine whether the forces generating that pattern are similar to those proposed by HS, we test whether uninformed traders act as trend-chasers, buying shares after periods of extremely positive returns, and selling shares after periods of extremely negative returns. Finally, we test whether reactions to news follow the impulse-response pattern in HS, with extreme news events followed by delayed overreactions and later reversals of those overreactions.
To test for price momentum and price reversal, we divide the first 270 seconds of trade for each security within each cohort into non-overlapping, 5-second portfolio-formation periods. 6 We measure the return of each period as the raw difference between the beginning and ending price, rather than as the percentage change, because changes in price and the liquidating dividend (as indicated by news releases) are not proportional to their current levels. We rank the portfolio-formation periods by return, and classify the periods in the top (bottom) quintile of returns as high-return (low-return) portfolios. We denote the end of each portfolio-formation period as time 0, so that the entire portfolio-formation period is in the time interval (-5 to 0), and then compute the average return for the period over the subsequent five seconds (0 to +5), the subsequent 30 seconds (0 to +30), and the 30 seconds after that (+30 to +60). We also conduct a similar analysis for non-overlapping 30-second portfolio-formation periods.
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Panel A of Table 1 shows that 5-second returns during the highest returns quintile are 9.51, while returns during the lowest quintile are -9.84. Returns in the subsequent five seconds (0 to +5) are 3.63 for the highest return quintile, and -3.59 for the lowest return quintile, a difference of 7.22, suggesting momentum over adjacent 5-second periods. Returns over the (0, 5 In settings with limitations on unrealized losses, traders saw a number in red indicating their unrealized loss as a percentage of the maximum unrealized loss allowed. 6 We ignore the last 10 seconds of trade, which include no changes in news.
+30) interval appear unaffected by returns during the portfolio-formation period, at 0.84 after high returns and 1.10 after low returns, a difference of -0.26. However, returns over the (+30, +60) interval reflect reversals, with returns of -2.56 after high returns and 4.23 after low returns, a difference of -6.80.
To determine whether differences in subsequent returns across return quintiles are statistically significant for each of the subsequent periods, we use a simple ANOVA analysis in which the dependent variable is the average return in the subsequent period for each return quintile within each cohort, and the independent measures are the cohort generating the price behavior and the return quintile (high or low). This way of computing dependent variables accounts for the fact that the observations in each cohort are not all independent. The p-values obtained from this analysis are equivalent to those that would be obtained from a repeatedmeasures analysis which accounts for the lack of independence between multiple observations obtained from the same cohort. This analysis shows clearly that the momentum over the (0, +5) interval is significant (p = 0.0005), as is the reversal over the (+30, +60) interval (p = 0.0004).
The very small p-values may seem surprising with so few independent observations, but those observations reflect the average of a very large number of observations from each cohort, and thus include very little random variation.
Panel A of buying or selling by uninformed traders will drive returns to be quite high or low.
Panel B of Table 1 shows strong evidence of trend-chasing by uninformed traders, responses to news are delayed by the informed traders, but that trend-chasing by the uninformed traders eventually creates overreactions to news that must be reversed. To provide further support for the claim that long-term reversal is driven by the correction of overreactions introduced by short-term momentum, we conduct a correlation analysis (untabulated). For this analysis, we measure short-term momentum as the ratio of returns over (0, +5) divided by the return over (-5, 0) , so that large positive values indicate strong momentum. We measure long-term reversal as the negative of the ratio of returns over (+30, +60) divided by the return of (-5, 0), so that large positive values indicate strong long-term reversal. We find a strong positive correlation between short-term momentum and long-term reversal (correlation coefficient = 0.3125, p = 0.0007), confirming the model's prediction.
III. Experiment Two
A. Objectives of Experiment Two
Our first experiment examined markets in which informed trader activity was automated as HS assume, but uninformed trader activity was unconstrained. These markets still showed evidence of short-term momentum and long-term reversal. Experiment one also showed that uninformed traders acted as momentum traders, which is consistent with the assumptions of HS, but is inconsistent with a large body of data suggesting that individual investors (who are presumed to be relatively uninformed) act as contrarians, not as momentum traders (see, for example, Kaniel, Saar and Titman 2006). One possible explanation for this discrepancy is that forces other than a lack of information are driving individual investors to be contrarians.
Alternatively, uninformed traders in our market may behave differently because they have information about price that informed traders did not have. In contrast, individual investors in real markets are trading against others who have access to both news and price histories. traders could "front-run" their information, trading actively in the knowledge that other traders will soon be receiving it, again mitigating short-term momentum). Manipulating the presence of uninformed traders also clarifies their role in influencing momentum and reversal, and allows us to observe how uninformed traders behave when they face informed traders who possess both news and price information.
B. Design and Details
During a 75-minute experimental session, participants in experiment two trade in one of five cohorts of either four human informed traders or one of four cohorts of four human informed traders and three human uninformed traders (cohorts trade together throughout the entire session). Each cohort takes part in twelve markets in which they trade unique securities (one at a time, as in experiment one), which follow predetermined news paths that vary across security, but are held constant across cohorts.
To test informed traders' reactions to slowly-disseminated information, we provide news in a way that is very similar to that described in HS. Value follows a random walk, with twelve innovations in the liquidating dividend occurring every three seconds. Each news innovation is distributed uniformly between -2.5 and 2.5, and is rounded to the nearest whole number. As in HS, news innovations are disseminated slowly through the population of informed traders.
Every three seconds, each informed trader receives an aggregated news signal which is the sum of one of the 12 news innovations for the current three-second period, one news innovation from the prior period, one news innovation from two periods ago, and so on for 12 periods. With this pattern, it takes 36 seconds for each informed trader to receive all 12 news innovations from a given three-second period's news release, and 9 seconds for all news from a given three-second period to known to at least one informed trader.
We make a variety of small changes from experiment one to allow clearer inferences in experiment two. Though current market price was based on trader demand (as in experiment one), price began at a new random level for every security and λ (the dealer risk tolerance term)
is set at 0.200 instead of 0.125, to allow markets to be more responsive to trader demand. Also similar to experiment one, the liquidating dividend stopped changing with 10 seconds remaining in the market to allow traders a "quiet time" in which to adjust their positions before payment of the liquidating dividend. Because a known ending point for traders could generate momentum with rational but risk-averse traders, 9 we determined the ending point by a Poisson distribution, and told traders only the parameters of the distribution, without revealing the end point. Finally, the session included no limits on unrealized losses, which had little effect on market or individual behavior in experiment one. Appendix B provides the written instructions for experiment two that differ from the instructions in experiment one.
C. Market Behavior without Uninformed Traders
We begin by analyzing results in the absence of uninformed traders. Our analysis of patterns in returns is similar to that in experiment one, except that we divide the trading period to non-overlapping, 6-second intervals to better fit the news dissemination pattern. Panel A of Table 2 presents returns after 6-and 30-second portfolio-formation periods. The table presents strong evidence of short-term momentum: in the (0, +6) interval, returns were 1.41 after the highest quintile of 6-second portfolio-formation periods, which is significantly higher than the -1.02 return after the lowest quintile (difference = 2.43; p = 0.0074). Over the (0, +30) interval, returns were 5.43 after the highest quintile of 6-second periods, which is higher than the -2.23 return after the lowest quintile (difference = 7.66; p = 0.0100). Results were similar following 30-second portfolio-formation periods, with returns significantly higher following the highest 9 We thank an anonymous reviewer for making this point. Panel A of Table 2 shows little evidence of long-term reversal following extreme returns.
While returns over the (+30, +60) interval are nominally lower after high returns than low returns in the 6-second portfolio-formation period (0.35 vs. 1.59), and after the 30-second portfolio-formation period (-0.92 vs. 1.80), neither different reaches conventional levels of significance (p = 0.1597 and p = 0.0918).
Overall, these results indicate that informed traders behave roughly as predicted by HS, even though they are able to observe prices as well as news: they fail to eliminate the short-term momentum in the average news they hold and do not generate long-term reversals. The impulseresponse analyses presented in Panel B of Table 2 Table 3 shows This is most easily seen by considering again the impulse-response analysis in Table 3 , Panel C, looking at the behavior of the uninformed traders and informed traders separately. In an untabulated analysis, we found that over the (0, +30) interval, the informed traders' trading exhibits a strong positive association with the news released during the 30-second portfolioformation period, buying 67.92 shares after good news and selling 64.75 shares after bad news (difference = 132.67, p = 0.0082). This is more than enough to outweigh the contrarian trading of the uninformed traders, who sell -29.98 shares after bad news and buy 35.39 shares after good news (difference = -65.37, p = 0.0421).
D. Market Behavior with Uninformed Traders
In contrast, news in the (+30, +60) interval shows little correlation with news in the portfolio-formation period, and neither do informed trader trades-informed traders buy 13.04
shares after good news and sell 6.02 shares after bad news (a non-significant difference of 19.06, p = 0.2649). As a result, any continuation of price movements is more than offset by the continued contrarian behavior of uninformed traders. In the (+30, +60) interval after a 30-second portfolio-formation period, uninformed traders are still selling 17.63 shares after good news and buying 17.28 shares after bad news. While this contrarian behavior is only marginally significant (difference = -34.91, p = 0.0712), it is correlated with informed trader behavior, so that overall price changes show a statistically significant reversal (p = 0.0022).
To bolster our claim that Hong and Stein's explanation for long-term reversal does not hold in this experiment, we replicate our correlation analysis from experiment one. For this analysis, we measure short-term momentum as the ratio of returns over (0, +6) divided by the return over (-6, 0) , so that large positive values indicate strong momentum. We measure longterm reversal as the negative of the ratio of returns over (+30, +60) divided by the return of (-6, 0), so that large positive values indicate strong long-term reversal. We find no correlation between short-term momentum and long-term reversal (correlation coefficient = 0.1732, p = 0.1449). Thus, in contrast with experiment one, we conclude that long-term reversals in experiment two are not driven by the correction of reversals.
IV. Conclusions
We report the results of two laboratory experiments that examine the behavior of uninformed traders and their influence on price momentum and reversal. In our first experiment, our markets include a computerized informed trader who conditions trades on autocorrelated news releases, and human uninformed traders who can condition their trades on price movements however they wish, but cannot observe news releases. Despite the fact that uninformed traders can base trading decisions on the complete price history, and can hold positions open as long as they wish, we still observe results similar to those predicted by Hong and Stein: market prices show short-term momentum and long-term reversal, because uninformed traders act as trendchasers, causing prices to overreact to information, and then reverse that overreaction.
In our second experiment, we replace the computerized informed trader with humans who can observe both news and price, and we then manipulate the presence of human uninformed traders. In the absence of uninformed traders, informed traders create price paths with short-term momentum, but no reversal. Introducing unformed traders does not eliminate short-term momentum, but does induce long-term reversal. However, the mechanism for reversal is quite different than that predicted by Hong and Stein (and observed in our first experiment): uninformed traders act as contrarian traders, taking on losing positions that run counter to price movements, and counter to news about fundamental value. Long-term reversals arise because uninformed traders' contrarian trading lasts longer than the informed traders' momentum trading.
Our results suggest that short-term momentum is likely to be a robust feature of financial markets, while long-term reversal is likely to arise only when markets include a sufficiently large component of traders who are willing to trade on the basis of price movements alone. Such traders are not likely to be rational, because their information set is dominated by those who see both news and price. However, our results are consistent with archival evidence that individual traders tend to be contrarians (e.g., Kaniel, Saar, and Titman 2006) , and suggests that information asymmetry might be driving that contrarian behavior.
One possible explanation for traders' inability to eliminate weak-form inefficiencies is that participants simply don't have enough experience or training, and that the momentum and reversal effects we observe would be eliminated with repetition or with a different group of participants. We believe this is unlikely to happen. Our traders are a well-trained and selfselected group. All of our traders voluntarily returned after at least two similar trading sessions.
Thus, while traders in our markets may not be particularly familiar with real markets, they are very familiar with our markets, which is what determines the wisdom of their strategies. Their willingness to return for subsequent sessions also suggests that they felt comfortable with the markets and seek out opportunities to profit from trading. Moreover, the result we report here became stronger, not weaker, with experience.
Naturally, our markets differ from naturally occurring markets in many ways, most obviously in scale. We measure momentum and reversal in seconds and minutes, rather than in months and years, and prices are determined by a handful of traders. These differences do not vitiate the contribution of the study, because like any sound experiment, ours seek to test theories of cause and effect, rather than simply create replicas of a target environment. Animal-based medical tests provide a helpful analogy for understanding the importance of testing causal theories. 10 A researcher who wishes to understand the efficacy of a drug treatment on humans may well first test its efficacy on animals. However, without a theory on the drug's mechanism, the researcher cannot know what animals might be appropriate subjects. A theory of cause and effect allows the researchers to ensure that the forces predicted to drive phenomena in the target environment are maintained in the controlled environment, and also allow specific tests of those mechanisms.
For example, assume a drug is conjectured to cure a condition by regulating the production of a particular hormone. A sound experiment would test the drug on animals who produce the hormone in a manner and intensity similar to humans, and a careful analysis would test not only that the drug is effective on animals, but also that its effectiveness is determined by its impact on hormone production. In the same way, our experiments test a theory that momentum and reversal are driven by the trend-chasing and short trading horizons of uninformed traders. We therefore create a setting that allows those behaviors to arise, and we measure both those particular causal mechanisms and their ultimate result (momentum and reversal).
The abbreviated scale of our laboratory markets is not particularly important to our inferences, because the theory we are testing has no sense of time scale other than that determined by the time-series properties of the news released to investors; it has no sense of market size other than to describe the dissemination of news among investors and guarantee that prices are set competitively. We constructed a setting in which the time scale for the news events was appropriate to the speed at which investors could process information and make trading decisions, and which included enough traders for news to disseminate slowly enough to create observable effects, and for prices to be set competitively. Future research could investigate whether slower or larger markets lead to substantially different behavior, either for economic or psychological reasons. However, we believe our markets are a useful first step in examining the validity of the behavioral assumptions underlying one important and widely-cited model of momentum and reversal.
Our study also takes some important methodological steps to advance the state of laboratory financial markets research. Most laboratory markets include periods with a single information release followed by trading in a double-auction market, as in the early studies of Plott and Sunder (1982) . However, phenomena like momentum and reversal typically arise in markets and models with new information arriving continually to the market. We are not aware of any other attempts to create a market with such an information structure. Our market setting was designed primarily to test theoretical explanations for momentum and reversal, but it can be useful for testing other dynamic models as well, including those used to explain the persistence of market bubbles (as in Abreu and Brunnermeier 2002; e.g., see Bhojraj, Bloomfield, and Tayler (2007) ) and the difficulties of arbitrage in the presence of noise traders (as in DeLong, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990) .
Figure 1 Sample News and Price Path
A sample news path (solid line) and price path (dotted line) from an actual market in experiment one are shown below. The timing of news releases was determined by a Poisson process, with an average of 1 second between news releases. Each news release either indicated a $1 increase or a $1 decrease in the liquidating dividend (the ending value of the news path determined the amount of the liquidating dividend-$525 in this example). The first news release was equally likely to be good news or bad news. After that point, each news release had a 95% chance of having the same direction (good or bad) as the preceding news release. As a result, the news paths exhibited strong positive autocorrelation over the short term, declining over longer intervals. The news path also indicates the path that prices would have taken, had uninformed traders never traded shares.
Figure 2 Example of a Uninformed trader Trading Screen
Below is an example of the trading screen seen by uninformed traders. The timer at the left indicates that 21 seconds remain in the 280 second trading session. The trader buys and sells shares buy clicking the buttons to the right of the timer. The stock chart is at the bottom right of the screen. The top third of stock chart shows historic market prices, while the bottom of the stock chart shows the bid-ask spread. (In the present study, these are virtually identical, because the bid-ask spread is fixed at 2 and there are frequent trades). The middle of the stock chart shows the volume of buys from the dealer and sells to the dealer. The top middle of the screen provides trading information. This hypothetical trader has bought 454 shares and sold 488 shares over the course of trading, leaving a net exposure of -34 shares (a short position). The average share revenue was 532; because current price is 541, the trader has an unrealized loss of 306, computed as -34*[541-532] = 306. (Participants in some settings were not allowed to exceed an unrealized loss limit; the frame on the far right indicates the current loss-limit setting. In this case, there is a loss limit of 500; another setting had no loss limit, and a third had a loss limit of 100; results in the study do not vary substantially by loss-limit setting. The screen indicates that this participants' unrealized loss is 61.2% (or 306/500) of the way toward the loss limit of 500.) Note that this trader has already incurred large realized losses of 2832 on the 454 round trip trades (shares bought and then sold, or sold and then bought). All information is updated at least once per second. A trade imbalance occurs when traders are buying more than they are selling, or selling more than they are buying. In today's session, market price will move by $1 as soon as there is a trade imbalance of 8 shares (i.e. "critical trade imbalance" = 8).
Traders
In addition to the dealer and the human traders, there will be one computerized robot trader participating in the market. All human traders receive the same information. The robot receives information regarding the direction of the disbursement level changes and follows the following trading strategy based on those directions, regardless of what the market price is at the time of the disbursement level change:
• If the disbursement level goes down by $1, the robot will sell 8 shares (moving the price down by $1).
• If the disbursement level goes up by $1, the robot will buy 8 shares (moving the price up by $1).
Trading Gains and Losses
You start trading each security with no shares. Negative share balances are permitted, so you can sell shares you don't own ("short selling"). There are no cash constraints, so you can buy as many shares as you want. If you have a positive share exposure when the liquidating disbursement is paid, you will receive the amount equal to the liquidating disbursement for each share you hold. If you have a negative share exposure at the time of liquidating disbursement, you must pay an amount equal to the liquidating disbursement for each share you are "short."
There are two ways to generate trading gains in this market:
• Buy a share and then sell it for more than you paid • Sell a share and then buy it back for less than you paid You can implement these strategies using very short holding periods (for example, selling a share and buying it back very quickly), or longer holding periods (for example, selling a share and buying it back after waiting for a while). The longest holding period would entail buying or selling a share and holding it until the liquidating disbursement is paid, so that you would close out your position at the liquidating disbursement amount.
How to Trade
You can trade shares by buying or selling, as follows:
• Click the "Buy 1" button to buy 1 share at the ask price ($1 above the market price).
• Click the "Buy 2" button to buy 2 shares at the ask price ($1 above the market price).
• Click the "Sell 1" button to sell 1 share at the bid price ($1 below the market price).
• Click the "Sell 2" button to sell 2 shares at the bid price ($1 below the market price).
Note: Since each trade has the potential to move price (if the trade imbalance is near the critical trade imbalance), if you buy or sell shares using the "Buy 2" or "Sell 2" buttons, it is possible that the purchase or sale prices on your shares won't be the same for both shares. Further, if the market price is moving rapidly, your trade might not be executed the first time you press the buy or sell buttons. You can always tell if you successfully bought or sold a share by watching the trade indicator banner at the top right hand side of the screen, or by watching the trade history spreadsheet at the lower left hand side of the screen.
Information Spreadsheet
The grey, purple, and yellow spreadsheet in the upper center of the screen contains information regarding your trades, as well as information regarding market activity.
Trading Activity This section indicates how many shares you have bought (a positive number) and sold (a negative number) as well as how many shares in total have been bought and sold by all five humans and the robot-for this security. The "Net Exposure" indicates your current exposure as well as the total of the exposures of the five human traders and the robot.
Information Release
The final disbursement level (with 10 seconds left of trading) will be given in this section.
Financial Measures
• Your average cost/revenue indicates the average you paid or received for each share you hold ("Average Cost" if your share balance is positive or "Average Revenue" if your share balance is negative). This line shows "na" if your share balance equals 0.
• Your realized gain/loss is a running total of your trading gains and losses (before the liquidating disbursement). o A trade that reduces your exposure (making a positive exposure less positive or a negative exposure less negative) adds to your realized gain/loss if you sell for more than your average cost or buy for less than your average revenue. o A trade that reduces your exposure reduces your realized gain/loss if you sell for less than your average cost or buy for more than your average revenue.
• Your unrealized gain/loss is a running total of the additional trading gains and losses you would have if you traded away all your exposure at the current market price. o If you have an unrealized loss, a red percentage number will appear next to the unrealized loss indicating how close you are to the limit. Once the number reaches 1.000 (100%) you have reached the unrealized loss limit and you will be forced to liquidate your shares.
• Your share exposure is your share balance and can be positive or negative. The more positive or negative your share exposure is at the end of trading, the more your final wealth will depend on the size of the liquidating disbursement. (The following page shows two examples of how the above financial measures are calculated.) o A positive share exposure at the end of trading means that you will gain money if the liquidating disbursement is higher than your average cost, but that you will lose money if the disbursement is lower than your average cost. o A negative exposure indicates that you will lose money at the end of trading if the liquidating disbursement is higher than your average revenue, but that you will gain money if the disbursement is lower than your average revenue.
Appendix B Instructions for Experiment Two (that Differ from Experiment One)
Value and Information
The value begins at 500 for the first security; all other securities begin at the final value of the previous security. After the start of trading, the value of each security changes every three seconds by the sum of 12 random numbers, each taking on values of -2, -1, 0, 1, 2 with equal likelihood.
Every market includes traders who see "news" about current value every two seconds. The "news" for each of these traders consists of some (but not all) of the most recent random numbers. News follows these rules:
• All traders see the news with a slight delay that is, on average, the same for all traders. Thus, no trader who sees news sees "better" or "newer" information than the others who see news. So everyone who sees news sees some news before anyone else has seen it, other news after everyone else who sees news has seen it, and yet other news before some people but after others.
• Any given piece of news is seen at different times by different traders.
• Eventually, every piece of news is seen by all traders who see news, except for the very first and very last changes in each period.
Your market may also include traders who don't see news at all. The experiment administrator will tell you how many traders who do and don't see news are in your market.
